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At the Lectern

Between Two Palm Trees:
Reading the Constitution in Paradise
Derek A. Webb
For as long as we have had a Constitution, we have been debating how to
interpret it. With the conclusion of the Supreme Court’s recent 2013 term and
its handful of closely divided, hotly contested cases,1 we can rest safe in the
assumption that, despite the notable uptick in unanimous decisions issued by
the Court,2 the figurative “end of history”3 in constitutional interpretation, in
which the major partisans in our annual Constitutional skirmishes lay down
their arms and settle upon one particular interpretive lens through which
to read the Constitution, is nowhere in sight. If Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison, two of the Constitution’s principal architects and leading
spokesmen who co-authored The Federalist, could not later agree on the meaning
of the words on the page to which they had signed their names, should we
expect to do any better?
But despite their deep disagreements over how to read the Constitution,
Americans from across the spectrum still seem to revere the old musty
document. In an era of increasing polarization4 and growing skepticism
Derek A. Webb is the 2014-2015 Supreme Court Fellow in the Office of the Counselor to the Chief
Justice and was previously a Fellow and Lecturer in the Constitutional Law Center at Stanford
Law School. The views and opinions in the article are the author’s alone.
1.

The major constitutional law related 5-4 decisions of the Supreme Court’s October Term
2013 (hereinafter “OT”) included McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014),
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014), Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), Hall
v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), and Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).

2.

Robert Barnes, For These Supreme Court Justices, Unanimous Doesn’t Mean Unity, Wash. Post,
July 1, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/for-thesesupreme-court-justices-unanimous-doesnt-mean-unity/2014/07/01/94003590-0132-11e4-b8ff89afd3fad6bd_story.html (suggesting that “stark divisions… exist on the court beneath a
frequent veneer of 9-0 comity.”).

3.

The phrase comes from Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992).

4.

Political Polarization in the American Public, Pew Research Ctr. (June 12, 2014), http://
www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf (detailing
various ways in which “Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines—
and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive—than at any point in the last two decades.”).
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about many things official5—Congress, the president, the Republican and
Democratic parties, business corporations, even the Supreme Court, etc.—
the Constitution remains, as it has throughout much of American history, a
document that continues to pull powerfully on the heartstrings of citizens.6
Americans may hate politics, as the pundit E. J. Dionne7 has observed, and
distrust their government, but they continue to love the governing document
that structures our politics and organizes our government.
And yet while Americans seem to revere the Constitution, they do not
necessarily read it that often.8 Not unlike that beautiful, color-coded collection
of the Great Works in the Western World that sits impressively in one’s home
library, quietly collecting dust along its immaculately gold-encrusted pages,
the thing is practically too good to read. Surely there is something better, and
easier, and more enjoyable available on Netflix? And who, frankly, makes a
point of reading the Constitution anyway, except for the occasional crank or
eccentric old senator? Why not leave that task to the professionally trained
lawyers among us whose job it is to pay attention to these sorts of things?
But one of the more remarkable facts about legal education today—and
indeed for some time now—is that aspiring lawyers themselves rarely get the
chance to study the Constitution as a whole. Instead, they encounter the
Constitution mostly sifted through the mediating prism of constitutional law,
the doctrines and precedents of the Supreme Court in which the Justices have
attempted to say what the Constitution, as law, is. And they usually do so in
ways that break up the overall text into more manageable and discrete bits,
often taken out of their original context and natural sequence. A traditional
constitutional law course, for instance, might begin with Article III, Section
2 (Marbury v. Madison), leap back to Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 (Commerce
Clause), hop forward to Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 (Necessary and Proper
Clause), jump back again to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (Spending Clause),
zoom forward to the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, retreat into the
President’s various sundry powers under Article II, Section 2, and then after a
further brief spell in Article I or III, depending upon tastes, conclude with the
privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2. The Bill of Rights
5.

See Jeffrey M. Jones, Confidence in U.S. Public Schools at New Low, Gallup (June 20, 2012), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/155258/Confidence-Public-Schools-New-Low.aspx; see also Millennials
in Adulthood: Detached from Institutions, Networked with Friends, Pew Research Ctr. (March 7, 2014),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/03/2014-03-07_generations-report-version-forweb.pdf.

6.

The AP-National Constitution Center Poll, Associated Press (August 2012), http://surveys.
ap.org/data%5CGfK%5CAP-NCC%20Poll%20August%20GfK%202012%20Topline%20
FINAL_1st%20release.pdf (reporting that 69% of Americans agree that the “The United
States Constitution is an enduring document that remains relevant today.”).

7.

See generally, E. J. Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics (1991).

8.

See Zinie Chen Sampson, Most in U.S. Haven’t Read Constitution, VA-based Survey Says,
PilotOnline.com
(Sept.
16,
2010),
http://hamptonroads.com/2010/09/
most-us-havent-read-constitution-vabased-survey-says.
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tends to suffer a similar, discombobulating fate.9 The First Amendment is
often studied on its own, with the religion clauses hermetically sealed from the
speech, press, and assembly clauses. The Fourth and parts of the Fifth, Sixth,
and Eighth Amendments are studied in a separate class on criminal procedure.
The Seventh is tackled in civil procedure. And Constitutional Law II takes up
the rest, with large helpings from the First (usually just speech and religion),
Second, Fifth (takings clause), Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In other
words, after three years of law school, you may have read it all at some point,
but probably not, and probably never in one sitting.
The piecemeal and often incomplete study of the Constitution in law
school is itself a function of studying the Constitution often exclusively
through the lens of Supreme Court decisions, which of necessity are focused
on just those relatively few parts of the text that are particularly susceptible to
litigation in courtrooms. Over the course of its first nine years, for example,
more than seventy-five percent of the constitutional law-themed cases that
came before the Roberts Court from 2005 to 2014 revolved exclusively around
six Amendments—the First (seventeen percent), Fourth (thirteen percent),
Fifth (eight percent), Sixth (twenty-one percent), Eighth (five percent), and
Fourteenth (thirteen percent).10 Now these Amendments unquestionably
represent seismic, critical, and hard-fought protections of the rights of
individuals and groups against government. But as a matter of sheer textual
heft, they make up less than ten percent of the entire text of the Constitution.
The vast majority of those laboring in the vineyards of Supreme Court
litigation and academic constitutional law, in other words, are focused on a
precious small bit of overworked terrain, while large swaths of rich acreage go
regularly unexplored and uncultivated.
This past academic year, I had the privilege to guide a few hardy souls
through those other parts, in a seminar here at Stanford Law School called
“Reading the Constitution.” Joining the ranks of other adventurous-sounding,
gerundively titled courses, like “Wildlife Trafficking” and “Accounting for
Lawyers,” the seminar was organized around the text of the Constitution itself,
beginning at the beginning, with the summoning of “We the People” in the
Preamble, and concluding with that 1990s throwback, the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, itself a throwback to an amendment that initially failed to secure
enough votes for ratification in the 1790s. In between, we encountered the
peaks and valleys, low-lying plains, mountainous cliffs, and seemingly hidden,
long-since-forgotten parts of what the constitutional theorist Sanford Levinson
has called both the “Constitution of Conversation,” that familiar ten percent
9.

For an extended analysis of the problems associated with studying the Bill of Rights in
disaggregated bits and pieces, see Burt Neuborne, “The House was Quiet and the World was
Calm the Reader Became the Book”—Reading the Bill of Rights as a Poem: An Essay in Honor of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2007 (2004).

10.

These numbers are based upon a review of the approximately 275 constitutional law-related
cases decided by the Supreme Court from 2005 through to the conclusion of its OT 2013 in
June 2014.
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of the text whose meaning remains largely contestable and which has thus
become a regular feature of Supreme Court litigation and public debate, and
the “Constitution of Settlement,” the rest of the document whose meaning
is mostly settled and uncontroversial, but which significantly and almost
subterraneously structures and defines much of our public life today.11
Reading all the Constitution in this way, and not just the juicy parts, seems
to make some space for thinking about the Constitution in ways that are
genuinely independent of politics and policy preferences. When one focuses
exclusively on the “Constitution of Conversation,” it is not uncommon for the
predictable polarities and pathologies of our broader political conversation
to replicate themselves in constitutional debates. This, in turn, tends to lead
sophisticated observers of these conversations to conclude, not without
some reason, that constitutional law, contra Justice Kagan,12 is really politics
all the way down, an infinitely malleable, thin veneer for policy preferences.13
Tell me what a person’s policy views are on abortion, prayer in school, gun
control, and affirmative action, the argument goes, and one can predict with
near certainty what his views will invariably be on seemingly technical legal
doctrines like substantive due process, the endorsement test, the relationship
between the prefatory and operative clauses of the Second Amendment,
and the level of scrutiny appropriate for racial classifications. Reading and
reasoning through the entire Constitution, by contrast, tends to disarm those
armies that otherwise clash by night over constitutional meaning, and opens
up a little room for listening to and learning from the text itself on its own
terms, and in its entirety.
Reading the entire text itself, by itself, on its own terms, however, does
not always answer all the questions one might have about constitutional
meaning. As Madison put it in 1796, looking back on his own handiwork from
the vantage point of nearly ten years, the text itself would have been just words
on a page, “nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into
it, by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state conventions.
If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument, beyond the
face of the instrument, we must look for it not in the general convention,
which proposed, but in the state conventions, which accepted and ratified the
11.

See Sanford Levinson, Framed: America’s Fifty-One Constitutions
Governance 19 (2012).

12.

During her confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Kagan,
responding to a question about whether law can only take the judge the “first twenty-five
miles of the marathon,” memorably said that it was actually “law all the way down.” The
Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103 (2010).

13.

Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. Times (May 10, 2014) http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/05/11/upshot/the-polarized-court.html?abt=0002&abg=1 (quoting
visiting
Stanford Law professor Justin Driver’s concern that it is “becoming increasingly difficult
to contend with a straight face that constitutional law is not simply politics by other means,
and that justices are not merely politicians clad in fine robes.”).
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constitution.”14 Perhaps following Madison’s lead on this, Supreme Court
advocates today frequently craft their litigation efforts with at least one eye
on the historical meaning of the text’s words and phrases. Since just 2000, for
example, lawyers have submitted more briefs to the Supreme Court that have
cited and engaged explicitly with the “original meaning” of various provisions
of the Constitution than had been done in all of the country’s previous
history. And last term, OT 2013, lawyers submitted briefs that engaged with
founding-era history or the original meaning of a phrase in the Constitution
in 23 distinct cases decided by the Court. Attentive to this fact, and lest the
seminar wrap up after just two hours of reading the Constitution with a long
coffee break, we also looked carefully at the text’s historical context, the often
colorful wellsprings of life, contestation, and compromise that breathed life
into the law.
When lawyers do history, the results are not always pretty. Just as
constitutional litigators are often charged with bending the text of the
Constitution to fit their preferred outcome for a particular case, lawyers’
legal history (as opposed to historians’ legal history15) is often suspected to
be little more than “law office history,” the selective and opportunistic lining
up of quotations from presumptively authoritative sources ripped from any
meaningful context that happen to most favor one’s position. Give me fifteen
minutes and I’ll get you the perfect quote from Thomas Jefferson to support
that motion for/against summary judgment. Additionally, when lawyers do
use founding-era history in particular, there is a suspicion that what really
motivates this is nothing more than an unreasoning “ancestor worship”16 in
which a presumptively monolithic set of “Founders” (with a capital F) sits
in disdainful judgment of whatever contemporary political, legal, or cultural
practice the speaker himself just so happens also to oppose. The Founders
would be appalled! And there is, of course, the alternative approach, which
returns the favor of disdain back upon the founders, judging their lot to
be a mostly monolithic cabal of wealthy, white, male, slavocratic aristocrats
whose achievements represent mostly obstacles to progress and the spread of
democracy.17
No single seminar could possibly grapple adequately with all of this. But by
spending some time with the original debates and conversations that produced
the Constitution, on their own terms, some progress can be made. We saw that
on at least some points of first principle and matters of specific constitutional
meaning, a viable and meaningful consensus seemed to exist at the time of the
14.

James Madison, Jay’s Treaty, in 16 The Papers of James Madison 290, 296 (J.C.A. Stagg et al.
eds., 1989).

15.

For the distinction between “lawyers’ legal history” and “historians’ legal history,” see
Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 168-71 (1996) (internal citations
omitted).

16.

See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 Texas L. Rev. 1, 63-66 (2009).

17.

For perhaps the earliest and most canonical statement of this position, see Charles Beard,
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913).
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text’s ratification. We also saw, however, as may be expected from a period
of great transition and creativity like the American founding, that much was
disputed as well, and that proponents and critics of the Constitution could be
lined up with different understandings and different evaluations of nearly every
little clause in it. We encountered intriguing figures from across the spectrum
now mostly lost to history whose impression of the new constitutional system
strikingly track many contemporary evaluations. Patrick Henry worried that
Article V would put future constitutional amendments at the mercy of an
astronomically small minority of opponents, making the Constitution simply
too difficult to amend through ordinary legal channels.18 Melancton Smith, a
moderate Anti-Federalist from New York, worried that the proposed federal
system would tend to ably represent the interests of the extremely wealthy and
well-placed, but remain mostly blind to those of the poor and middle classes,
while sadly and seemingly permanently baking the protection of slavery into
its very institutional architecture.19 And James Wilson, an influential Federalist
from Pennsylvania, expressed profound concern that the equal representation
of different-size states in the Senate and the Electoral College could not be
squared with basic principles of democracy.20
And finally, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively surprising, we found
that the study of the historical context of the text of the Constitution is not
just a riveting 120-episode-long show of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
George Washington and the gang from 1787, but equally and just as important,
the story of the life that was breathed into it during the Reconstruction Era
after the Civil War, and the Progressive and Modern Era Amendments after
that, which in various ways great and small, filled in, corrected, and completed
the original Constitution.21 For all the fresh and first-rate historical research
that has been done on the American founding over the past two generations,
given the importance of these subsequent amendments to the overall structure
of the Constitution, particularly via the Reconstruction Amendments, we
stumbled through key pieces of constitutional history whose story and import
have yet to be fully told. One small indication of this lopsided historical
18.

Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention, in The Founders’ Constitution (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
a5s9.html.

19.

Melancton Smith, New York Ratifying Convention, in The Founders’ Constitution (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/v1ch13s37.html.

20.

Records of the Federal Convention, in The Founders’ Constitution (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 2000), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_3_12s3.html.

21.

For the ways in which some of the post-founding amendments to the Constitution may
have “completed” the original, see Michael P. Zuckert, Completing the Constitution: The Thirteenth
Amendment, 4 Const. Comment. 259 (1987), and Michael P. Zuckert, Completing the Constitution:
The Fourteenth Amendment and Constitutional Rights, 22 Publius 69 (1992). See also Akhil Reed
Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (2005), which served as a key text for the
seminar.
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emphasis is that while there exists an impressive and easily accessible fivevolume, 3,200-page collection of primary documents keyed to everything in
the Constitution’s text from the Preamble to the Twelfth Amendment known
as “The Founders Constitution,”22 no comparable collection has yet to be
produced for the Reconstruction, Progressive, or Modern-Era Amendments.
Thus, just as constitutional law often focuses on a small percentage of the
overall text of the Constitution, neglecting much that is fascinating and
relevant, so too does constitutional history occasionally reflect an imbalance
in its coverage of the unquestionably key first moment, at the expense of
reflecting upon the significance of other moments in which life and validity
were breathed into it over and over again.
A seminar like this is surely no substitute for more traditional constitutional
law classes that focus primarily upon Supreme Court doctrine. It is more
like a supplement, or perhaps in some ways a prequel, to these standard
classes, an exploration of the vast and fascinating terrain of text and historical
context often overlooked in doctrinal classes, but which in many ways sets
the stage for those doctrinal developments, and may even give one a better
perspective from which to understand and evaluate those developments. A
few law students in every graduating class will go on to practice in the field
of constitutional law litigation, in which the balancing formulae, three-part
tests, and various levels of scrutiny engineered by the courts will be their daily
tools. Far more, however, will go on to simply become citizens who follow
the news, vote, write in to local or national newspapers, engage in, or at least
try to gracefully endure, extended political commentary on social media,
navigate the competing claims about the Constitution from the anchors and
interviewees at MSNBC and Fox News, support candidates for office, and
possibly run for elected office themselves. To take just one fairly obvious metric
for this last point, fifty-seven percent of current U.S. senators and thirty-eight
percent of members of the House of Representatives are themselves graduates
of law schools.23
But in the push and pull of the political world, too, no less than in the
venerable and orderly halls of courtrooms, the Constitution is often a
matter of daily conversation and disputation, with conservatives and liberals,
Republicans and Democrats, the Tea Party and the Occupy Movement, and
the modern-day heirs of Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine laying claim to
the Constitution and regularly putting forward their agendas as a restoration
or fulfillment of its core meaning. Happily, however, and on its own terms,
the Constitution is not the platform for any political party, but rather that
singular document in our increasingly polarized political life that transcends
these divisions and structures the terms in which those contending forces do
daily battle. To (opportunistically) quote Thomas Jefferson (out of context),
22.

The Founders’ Constitution (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/.

23.

Jennifer E. Manning, Cong. Research Serv., R42964, Membership
Congress: A Profile 5 (2014).
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when it comes to the Constitution, in other words, “we are all Federalists, we
are all Republicans.”24 Therefore, whether we are discussing the tiny portion
of the Constitution annually litigated inside the Court, or the vast majority
of the Constitution that structures much of our public life on a daily basis
outside the Court, it will pay off for both categories of lawyers, from all points
along the political spectrum, to have spent some time carefully reading the
Constitution in its entirety. And if they can do so in paradise, so much the
better.

24.

Jefferson said “we are all republicans; we are all federalists” at his first inaugural address,
but later newspaper commentary of the time capitalized the nouns and reversed their order.
See First Inaugural Address, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 33: 17 February to 30
April 1801 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006), available at https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/
selected-documents/first-inaugural-address.

